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THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF AMERICAN BASES (CAAB) |
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THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF AMERICAN BASES (CAAB) |
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Oct. 23, 2003. 01:00 AM
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Canada's military will GORDON BARTHOS Shaken by 9/11, the United States has placed itself on a war footing that most Canadians struggle to comprehend. It's on open display here at the North American Aerospace Defence Command headquarters in Colorado Springs, buried 2,500 feet inside a granite mountain that can withstand a 30-megatonne nuclear hit. "We want to be able to smoke 'em in their silos," says U.S. Air Force Gen. Bob DuLaney, flashing a winning grin, "and let them worry about the fallout." He's referring to North Korea's missiles, and similar threats. With those few words, the blunt-talking Texan sums up U.S. President George Bush's decision to create a Northern Command to better defend continental North America against attack by hostile regimes or terrorists; Bush's fiercely "pre-emptive" approach to hammering America's enemies; and his missile defence program. There, too, is the Excedrin headache facing Prime Minister Jean Chrétien in his final weeks in office, and his likely successor, Paul Martin. Neither wants to be remembered as the prime minister who tore up Canada's most important strategic alliance, or let it wither away. While Canada has 250 or more separate nuts-and-bolts military agreements with the United States, only the 1958 NORAD treaty qualifies as a truly strategic continental pact. As American and Canadian officers keep vigil over North America's skies and seas, tracking 8,000 space objects and 7,000 aircraft flights daily, NORAD's Canadian deputy commander Lt.-Gen. Rick Findley provides the information that will be used to scramble warplanes to intercept hijacked aircraft, cruise missiles, remote-controlled pilotless aircraft or other threats. No U.S. ally, not even Britain, enjoys so close a relationship. NORAD's powerful sensors can detect a soccer ball 22,000 miles out in space. Does Paul Martin want to begin his prime ministry by walking away from this unique partnership in a 9/11 world, or by letting it wither? Not likely. So the betting here is that Ottawa will soon agree to participate in Bush's missile defence, under NORAD, though we needn't agree to operate interceptor missiles. U.S. commanders can do that. We might extend NORAD as well, to cover some common military operations at sea and on land, when the pact is renegotiated by May 12, 2006. These measures would swiftly establish Martin as a prime minister Washington can do business with, after a season of chilly relations. They'd also give Martin more latitude to disagree with Washington on other issues, as we did over Iraq. But they'd no doubt heat things up in Ottawa where skepticism about missile defence lingers. There's reason to be skeptical. The $20 billion plan to install 10 interceptor missiles in California and Alaska next year, 10 more in 2005 and 20 aboard warships is rushing science too fast. The U.S. General Accounting Office itself reports that of the 10 technologies the system needs, just two work. The threat from places like North Korea, while not insignificant, is open to debate. And the Americans themselves seem unsure of how their admittedly experimental program will evolve. Yet Bush has boxed Canada into a corner by pushing ahead. Would it make sense to scrap our strategic alliance over it? If Ottawa repudiates missile defence, Washington will be tempted to pull back NORAD's space-surveillance role into American hands, to ensure that the same officers who identify a missile threat can also attack it. NORAD would wither. Asked whether NORAD's Canadian deputy chief could continue to func-tion as before if Ottawa rejects a role in missile defence, Gen. Findley offers this diplomatic answer: "That's the part that's awkward, and I don't have a nice clear answer for you." Canadians would also lose our privileged access to American intelligence data from space, to American strategic thinking, and to high-tech military contracts. Canada's sovereignty would be compromised, to the degree that our ability to influence the shape of continental defence would be diminished. Given the current mood in Washington, "Canadians have to treat American security perspectives with respect even if we don't fully buy into the administration's assessment," warns David Rudd, head of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. "The Americans aren't debating missile defence, they're moving ahead. So whatever debate we have here is irrelevant." Indeed, the entire North Atlantic Treaty Organization has agreed to "examine options for protecting alliance territory, forces and population centres against the full range of missile threats." Our Japanese and Russian partners in the Group of Eight industrial club are doing likewise. The British and Danes are even stronger supporters. In this fast-shifting climate expanding NORAD makes more sense than contracting it. NORAD provides for shared command and a permanent Canadian deputy commander. It's regularly renegotiated. And it can be terminated on a year's notice if things get crazy. Still, before Chrétien or Martin give the go-ahead, Parliament should be consulted as it was when NORAD was created four decades ago. Will Canadians endorse missile defence? Would radars or interceptor sites be located on our territory? What will it cost us? What are the prospects for "weaponizing" space 15 or 20 years from now? The Outer Space Treaty prohibits the placing of weapons of mass destruction in space, like nuclear weapons. But it does not prohibit all weapons. Finally, just what does Martin mean by saying the Canadian military needs beefing up, after a decade of cuts he imposed as finance minister? How would he reshape the forces' roles? How much would he reinvest? This debate won't be over when Ottawa clarifies its stand on missile defence. It will barely have begun. |